

Advanced Modern Macroeconomics

Public Finance

Max Gillman

Cardiff Business School

6 December 2010

Chapter 18: Public Finance

Chapter Summary

- Focus on government budget constraint.
 - Initial start-up, each period, over complete time.
 - Budget constraint built period by period;
 - taken to limit: notion of government wealth constraint.
 - Includes limiting condition on government borrowing.
- Ricardian equivalence:
 - means government wealth constraint is binding;
 - solvent government must repay value of spending, debt,
 - with value of tax revenue, other funding sources.
 - Debt: discounted flow of revenue net of spending;
 - no net wealth residual from government borrowing.
- Examples:
 - seigniorage from printing money, and money-output ratio;
 - EU Maastricht Treaty mathematical link between deficits, debt;
 - optimal taxes with implied deficit, debt totals.

Building on the Last Chapters

- Chapter 3 introduces government budget constraint, taxes.
 - also found in Chapters 6, 9.
 - Last chapter: government borrowing through bonds.
 - Taxes on goods, labor income, capital income, plus issuing bonds,
 - now also supplemented by printing money for spending.
- Main difference: implications over time developed.
 - to form government wealth constraint,
 - like consumer wealth constraint construction
 - from each period budget constraint.
- The infinite stream of revenue, spending, with discounting
 - related to stock valuation of last chapter.
 - Discounting key element of finance theory,
 - both for private markets and government finance.

- Derive wealth constraint
 - adding up government time constraints at each period,
 - as discounted by interest rate.
- Concept of Ricardian equivalence;
 - how simple concept can be applied,
 - to a variety of financial elements,
 - including deficit and debt limits
 - of the European Union.
- See role of printing money in financing government:
 - an implicit tax that like other taxes
 - adds to government revenue.

Who Made It Happen

- David Ricardo: *The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*,
 - with last (3rd) edition of 1821; anything spent now paid for later.
 - Respect for government intertemporal budget constraint:
 - borrowing, spending today paid off by taxes in future.
 - Called "Ricardian equivalence".
- Non-Ricardian theories in contrast:
 - government spending financed by borrowing
 - with positive net effect on economy.
- Keynes 1936: increase government spending
 - as way out of 1930s Great Depression,
 - also proposed in 2007-2010 world recession.
 - "Keynesian" economics policy prescription, Hansen 1953, 1960,
 - questioned by nature of Ricardian equivalence.
- Barro 1979 revived Ricardian equivalence.
 - Woodford 2003 revives non-Ricardian ideas,
 - of new Keynesian policy agenda to run up debt, spending.
 - Ricardian theory: short term solutions burden future generations.

Government Budget and Wealth Constraints

- Infinite sequence of current period budget constraints,
 - rather than just two periods, combined into wealth constraint.
- Initial period revenue and spending
 - Let time period -1 start-up period
 - when government raises capital by issuing debt, B_0 ,
 - and by issuing money, denoted by M_0 .
 - Collect capital from representative agent:
 - equal to initial capital investment k_0 by consumer.
- Government spends initial capital on time -1
 - government infrastructure, in law, property rights,
 - with spending denoted by G_{-1} :
$$k_0 = B_0 + M_0 = G_{-1}.$$
- Government also sets up tax collection process at time -1 .
 - with proportional labor income, capital income, consumption taxes,
 - denoted by τ_l, τ_k, τ_c .

Subsequent Period Budget Constraints

- Time $t = 0$, government spends G_0 ,
 - pays interest on initial debt: $R_0 B_0$,
 - collects tax revenue $\tau_l w_0 l_0 h_0 + \tau_k r_0 k_0 + \tau_c c_0$.
 - Can issue new debt, money stock, $(B_1 - B_0) + (M_1 - M_0)$:

$$G_0 + R_0 B_0 = (\tau_l w_0 l_0 h_0 + \tau_k r_0 k_0 + \tau_c c_0) + (B_1 - B_0) + (M_1 - M_0).$$

- Discounted spending, revenue over two periods at time -1 :

$$G_{-1} + \frac{G_0 + R_0 B_0}{1 + R_0} = B_0 + M_0 + \frac{(\tau_l w_0 l_0 h_0 + \tau_k r_0 k_0 + \tau_c c_0) + (B_1 - B_0) + (M_1 - M_0)}{1 + R_0}.$$

- Any subsequent period t : period budget constraint is

$$G_t + R_t B_t = (\tau_l w_t l_t h_t + \tau_k r_t k_t + \tau_c c_t) + (B_{t+1} - B_t) + (M_{t+1} - M_t).$$

Wealth Constraint with Discount after Initial Period

- Add all period budget constraints, with discounting for future

$$\begin{aligned} & G_{-1} + \frac{G_0 + R_0 B_0}{1 + R_0} + \frac{G_1 + R_1 B_1}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)} \\ & + \frac{G_2 + R_2 B_2}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)(1 + R_2)} + \dots \\ = & B_0 + M_0 + \frac{(\tau_l w_0 l_0 h_0 + \tau_k r_0 k_0 + \tau_c c_0) + B_1 - B_0 + M_1 - M_0}{1 + R_0} \\ & + \frac{(\tau_l w_1 l_1 h_1 + \tau_k r_1 k_1 + \tau_c c_1) + (B_2 - B_1) + (M_2 - M_1)}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)} \\ & + \frac{(\tau_l w_2 l_2 h_2 + \tau_k r_2 k_2 + \tau_c c_2) + (B_3 - B_2) + (M_3 - M_2)}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)(1 + R_2)} + \dots \end{aligned}$$

- Wealth constraint gives future discounted stream of spending
 - as equal to initial debt, money issue,
 - plus discounted stream of taxes.

Wealth Constraint with Different Terms Accumulated

- Government expenditure, tax, bond, money terms:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & G_{-1} + \frac{G_0}{1 + R_0} + \frac{G_1}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)} \\
 & + \frac{G_2}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)(1 + R_2)} + \dots \\
 = & \frac{\tau_l w_0 l_0 h_0 + \tau_k r_0 k_0 + \tau_c c_0}{1 + R_0} + \frac{\tau_l w_1 l_1 h_1 + \tau_k r_1 k_1 + \tau_c c_1}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)} + \\
 & \frac{\tau_l w_2 l_2 h_2 + \tau_k r_2 k_2 + \tau_c c_2}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)(1 + R_2)} + \dots \\
 & B_0 - \frac{B_0}{1 + R_0} - \frac{R_0 B_0}{1 + R_0} + \frac{B_1}{1 + R_0} + \frac{B_2 - B_1 - B_1 R_1}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)} \\
 & + \frac{B_3 - B_2 - B_2 R_2}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)(1 + R_2)} + \dots + M_0 + \frac{M_1 - M_0}{1 + R_0} \\
 & + \frac{M_2 - M_1}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)} + \frac{M_3 - M_2}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)(1 + R_2)} + \dots
 \end{aligned}$$

Bond Transversality and Wealth Constraint

- First focus on bond terms B_0 of wealth constraint:

$$B_0 - \frac{B_0}{1 + R_0} - \frac{R_0 B_0}{1 + R_0} = B_0 - \frac{B_0 (1 + R_0)}{1 + R_0} = B_0 - B_0 = 0.$$

- They cancel out; sum to zero. Same for time B_1 , B_2 terms:

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{B_1}{1 + R_0} - \frac{B_1 + B_1 R_1}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)} \\ = & \frac{B_1}{1 + R_0} - \frac{B_1 (1 + R_1)}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)} = \frac{B_1}{1 + R_0} - \frac{B_1}{1 + R_0} = 0. \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{B_2}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)} - \frac{B_2 + B_2 R_2}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)(1 + R_2)} \\ = & \frac{B_2}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)} - \frac{B_2 (1 + R_2)}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)(1 + R_2)} = 0. \end{aligned}$$

- Continues forever, for all t , all finite time bonds term cancel out.

Bond Term as Time Approaches Infinity

- At last only term left is one as t goes to infinity; bond terms:

$$\begin{aligned} & B_0 - B_0 + \frac{B_1}{1 + R_0} + \frac{B_2 - B_1(1 + R_1)}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)} \\ & + \frac{B_3 - B_2(1 + R_2)}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)(1 + R_2)} + \dots \\ = & 0 + 0 + 0 + \dots + \lim_{j \rightarrow \infty} \left[\frac{B_{t+j}}{(1 + R_{t+1})(1 + R_{t+2}) \cdots (1 + R_{t+j})} \right]. \end{aligned}$$

- "Transversality" assumption is that last term is zero.
 - Present discounted value of stock of bonds at time $t \rightarrow \infty$, is 0.

$$\lim_{j \rightarrow \infty} \left[\frac{B_{t+j}}{(1 + R_{t+1})(1 + R_{t+2}) \cdots (1 + R_{t+j})} \right] = 0.$$

- Means discounted value of government debt in limit is zero.
- Bonds completely drop out of government wealth constraint.

- Ricardian equivalence: all spending eventually paid for by taxes.
 - Spending not paid for only by increasing borrowing
 - forever without raising taxes, since debt value in limit positive,
 - violating transversality condition.
- If transversality condition expected to be violated,
 - harder for government borrow through issuing bonds:
 - market would view bonds as obligation not intended to be kept.
- With transversality condition: wealth constraint is
 - discounted stream of government expenditure
 - equals discounted stream of taxes and money supply increases;
 - no residual debt.

Impossibility Theorem of Non-Ricardian Equivalence

- Suppose transversality condition does not hold, and

$$\lim_{j \rightarrow \infty} \left[\frac{B_{t+j}}{(1 + R_{t+1})(1 + R_{t+2}) \cdots (1 + R_{t+j})} \right] > 0,$$

- then Ricardian equivalence does not hold.
- Similar to asset price bubble permanently existing.
- Government wealth constraint not binding.
- This is idea of "Non-Ricardian" world.
- Kocherlakota, Phelan 1999: non-Ricardian world
 - impossible to prove as existing, or not existing.
 - Implies "impossibility theorem" of showing non-Ricardian equilibria.
- Transversality condition not binding: government debt held?
- Often non-Ricardian world taken to mean
 - taxes do not have to be increased for higher government expenditure.
 - Might be called "irresponsible guide to government finance",
 - as opposed to the much less glamorous Ricardian world:
 - of having to pay for expenditure with taxes.

Bonds as Net Wealth?

- Bond acts as "wealth" to consumer,
 - as in non-Ricardian models. "Overlapping generations" models:
 - only two time periods; government debt increases wealth to current consumer;
 - imposes tax burden to future generations; output still rises now.
- Others argue that economies can be in non-Ricardian world
 - for a limited period of time, but not permanently.
 - Type of concept in-between an infinite horizon, 2-period models.
 - More a descriptive concept of government issuing a lot of debt.
 - Not a mathematical description of equilibrium.
- Governments lose credibility if do not pay off debt,
 - pay high risk premia on debt: implies even informally
 - how Ricardian equivalence, transversality condition of bonds,
 - are realistic parts of macroeconomics.

Balanced Growth Path Government Tax Revenue

- Assume on balanced growth path equilibrium,
 - with endogenous growth rate g , at time 0 and every period after.
 - Assume inflation is zero, nominal price of goods $P_t = 1$.
 - Constant: nominal interest rate R_t , real interest r_t , wage w_t .
 - Growing variables: capitals k_t , h_t , consumption c_t , spending G_t ,
 - real money supply $\frac{M_t}{P_t}$.
 - Same results hold for exogenous growth.
- Tax Component

$$\frac{\tau_l w_0 l_0 h_0 + \tau_k r_0 k_0 + \tau_c c_0}{1 + R_0} + \frac{\tau_l w_1 l_1 h_0 + \tau_k r_1 k_1 + \tau_c c_1}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)} +$$
$$\frac{\tau_l w_2 l_2 h_0 + \tau_k r_2 k_2 + \tau_c c_2}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)(1 + R_2)} + \dots$$

$$r_0 = r_1 = \dots = r_t = \dots; w_0 = w_1 = \dots = w_t = \dots$$

$$R_0 = R_1 = \dots = R_t = \dots; l_0 = l_1 = \dots = l_t = \dots$$

Simplified Discounted Tax Revenue Stream

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{\tau_l w_0 l_0 h_0 + \tau_k r_0 k_0 + \tau_c c_0}{1 + R_0} \\ & + \frac{\tau_l w_0 l_0 h_0 (1 + g) + \tau_k r_0 k_0 (1 + g) + \tau_c c_0 (1 + g)}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_0)} + \\ & + \frac{\tau_l w_0 l_0 h_0 (1 + g)^2 + \tau_k r_0 k_0 (1 + g)^2 + \tau_c c_0 (1 + g)^2}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_0)(1 + R_0)} + \dots \\ = & \frac{\tau_l w_0 l_0 h_0 + \tau_k r_0 k_0 + \tau_c c_0}{1 + R_0} \left(1 + \frac{1 + g}{1 + R_0} + \left(\frac{1 + g}{1 + R_0} \right)^2 + \dots \right) \\ = & \frac{(\tau_l w_0 l_0 h_0 + \tau_k r_0 k_0 + \tau_c c_0)}{R_0 - g} = \frac{\tau_l w_0 l_0 h_0 + \tau_k r_0 k_0 + \tau_c c_0}{\rho(1 + g)}. \end{aligned}$$

Government Spending Component

$$\begin{aligned} & G_{-1} + \frac{G_0}{1 + R_0} + \frac{G_1}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)} \\ & + \frac{G_2}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)(1 + R_2)} + \dots \\ = & G_{-1} + \frac{G_0}{1 + R_0} \left(1 + \frac{1 + g}{1 + R_0} + \left(\frac{1 + g}{1 + R_0} \right)^2 + \dots \right) \\ = & G_{-1} + \frac{G_0}{1 + R_0} \left(\frac{1}{1 - \frac{1 + g}{1 + R_0}} \right) \\ = & G_{-1} + \frac{G_0}{R_0 - g} \\ = & G_{-1} + \frac{G_0}{\rho(1 + g)}. \end{aligned}$$

Money Printing Component

When zero inflation, BGP growth rate g : M_t grows at rate g .

$$\begin{aligned} & M_0 + \frac{M_1 - M_0}{1 + R_0} + \frac{M_2 - M_1}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)} \\ & + \frac{M_3 - M_2}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)(1 + R_2)} + \dots \\ = & M_0 + \frac{M_0(1 + g) - M_0}{1 + R_0} + \frac{M_0(1 + g)^2 - M_0(1 + g)}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_0)} \\ & + \frac{M_0(1 + g)^3 - M_0(1 + g)^2}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_0)(1 + R_0)} + \dots \\ = & \left(M_0 - \frac{M_0}{1 + R_0} \right) \left(1 + \frac{1 + g}{1 + R_0} + \left(\frac{1 + g}{1 + R_0} \right)^2 + \dots \right) \\ = & \frac{R_0 M_0}{R_0 - g} = M_0 \left(\frac{\rho(1 + g) + g}{\rho(1 + g)} \right) = M_0 \left(1 + \frac{g}{\rho(1 + g)} \right). \end{aligned}$$

Wealth Constraint with Balanced Growth

$$G_{-1} + \frac{G_0}{\rho(1+g)} = \frac{\tau_l w_0 l_0 h_0 + \tau_k r_0 k_0 + \tau_c c_0}{\rho(1+g)} + M_0 \left(1 + \frac{g}{\rho(1+g)} \right);$$

$$M_0 + B_0 + \frac{G_0}{\rho(1+g)} = \frac{\tau_l w_0 l_0 h_0 + \tau_k r_0 k_0 + \tau_c c_0}{\rho(1+g)} + M_0 \left(1 + \frac{g}{\rho(1+g)} \right);$$

$$\frac{G_0}{\rho(1+g)} = \frac{\tau_l w_0 l_0 h_0 + \tau_k r_0 k_0 + \tau_c c_0}{\rho(1+g)} + \frac{gM_0}{\rho(1+g)} - B_0.$$

$$B_0 = \frac{\tau_l w_0 l_0 h_0 + \tau_k r_0 k_0 + \tau_c c_0 + gM_0 - G_0}{\rho(1+g)}.$$

- Inflation rate denoted by π_t ; with P_t price of goods,

$$1 + \pi_t \equiv \frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t}.$$

- "Fisher equation" of nominal interest rate R_t , derived Chapter 20 :

$$1 + R_t = (1 + \pi_t) (1 + r_t - \delta_k).$$

- When $\pi_t = 0$, the nominal equals real: $R_t = r_t - \delta_k$.
- Assume constant money supply growth rate σ :

$$M_{t+1} = M_t (1 + \sigma),$$

- if $\sigma = g$, then $\pi_t = 0$,
- since money supply growth equals money demand growth.
- Money revenue: $\frac{R_0 M_0}{R_0 - \sigma} = M_0 + \frac{M_0(1+\sigma) - M_0}{1+R_0} + \frac{M_0(1+\sigma)^2 - M_0(1+\sigma)}{(1+R_0)(1+R_0)} + \dots$
 - Instead of $\frac{R_0 M_0}{R_0 - g}$, but same if $\sigma = g$, $\pi_t = 0$.

Revenue from Inflation

- When money supply growth rate σ rises,
 - can get more direct revenue from inflation tax,
 - which is "collected" as government prints the money.
 - Quantitative easing: new name for printing money,
 - by having central bank buy government bonds,
 - and giving money to government Treasury.
- Second, higher inflation can lower real value of nominal debt,
 - by reducing real value of debt interest payments.
 - When inflation raises nominal interest rate above expected rate,
 - reduces value of debt liabilities.
- Third: inflation can reduce stream of direct tax revenues,
 - by causing a lower endogenous growth rate.
 - Partly offsets gains in revenue from collecting inflation tax,
 - and lowering value of debt obligations.

Example 18.1 Seigniorage Wealth

- Considering only additions to money supply as revenue,
 - subtract initial money stock as revenue,

$$\frac{R_0 M_0}{R_0 - \sigma} - M_0 = M_0 \left(\frac{R_0 - R_0 + \sigma}{R_0 - \sigma} \right) = \frac{\sigma M_0}{R_0 - \sigma}.$$

- Written as a fraction of nominal output $P_0 y_0$, with $m \equiv \frac{M}{P}$:

$$\frac{\frac{\sigma M_0}{R_0 - \sigma}}{P_0 y_0} = \frac{m_0}{y_0} \frac{\sigma}{R_0 - \sigma}.$$

- Assume $\sigma = 0.03$, $R_0 = 0.06$, as fraction of output

$$\text{Seigniorage Wealth} : \frac{m_0}{y_0} \frac{\sigma}{R_0 - \sigma} = \frac{m_0}{y_0} \frac{0.03}{0.03} = \frac{m_0}{y_0}.$$

- Equals money supply to output ratio:
 - inverse of "income velocity" of money $\frac{y}{m}$.
- Velocity of money varies by country, across time
 - can be 15 – 20 after high inflation, as low as 2 historically in US.
 - Seigniorage wealth as ratio to output: between 5% and 50%.

Government Debt from Deficits

- While running a deficit, government runs up a liability.
 - Define debt build-up from continuous deficits as D_0 :

$$D_0 = \frac{G_0 - (\tau_l w_t l_0 h_0 + \tau_k r_0 k_0 + \tau_c c_0 + gM_0)}{\rho(1+g)}.$$

- Amount of debt liability incurred by perpetual deficits.
- Debt to y ratio: divide by output:

$$\frac{D_0}{y_0} = \frac{G_0 - (\tau_l w_0 l_0 h_0 + \tau_k r_0 k_0 + \tau_c c_0 + gM_0)}{y_0 \rho(1+g)}.$$

- Deficit to y ratio:

$$\frac{\text{Deficit}}{y_0} = \frac{G_0 - (\tau_l w_0 l_0 h_0 + \tau_k r_0 k_0 + \tau_c c_0 + gM_0)}{y_0}.$$

Example 18.2 Maastricht Treaty Debt, Deficit Limits

- Deficit to y ratio:

$$\frac{\text{Deficit}}{y_0} = \frac{G_0 - (\tau_l w_0 l_0 h_0 + \tau_k r_0 k_0 + \tau_c c_0 + gM_0)}{y_0} = 0.03..$$

- Debt to GDP limit of 60% consistent $\frac{\text{Deficit}}{y_0} = 0.03$?

$$\frac{D_0}{y_0} = \frac{G_0 - (\tau_l w_0 l_0 h_0 + \tau_k r_0 k_0 + \tau_c c_0 + gM_0)}{y_0 \rho (1 + g)} = \frac{0.03}{\rho (1 + g)}.$$

- Use baseline endogenous growth economy calibration,
- assume $\rho = 0.0526$, $g = 0.02$:

$$\frac{D_0}{y_0} = \frac{0.03}{\rho (1 + g)} = \frac{0.03}{0.0526 (1 + 0.02)} = 0.559.$$

- 56% debt to GDP from 3% deficit to output ratio
 - within limit of 60% of Treaty guidelines, in this example.
 - Higher deficits, lower growth: debt ratio could be above 60%.

- Ramsey solution to optimal public finance:
 - equalize value of marginal distortion across different taxes.
 - Focuses on how to raise taxes efficiently.
 - On margin, distortionary effect should be same.
 - Otherwise, one tax used too much while another too little.
- Assuming exogenous government expenditure G_t :
 - central result is zero capital income tax,
 - since intertemporally substitutable goods like capital can be avoided,
 - while goods like current period labor cannot be avoided:
 - tax only labor and/or goods, not capital.
- Result does not hold
 - if government spending a constant share of output.
 - Then can get equal labor, capital tax rates.

Spending as a Constant Share of Output

- Assume government spending a constant fraction of output
 - η a constant fraction, financed with labor, capital taxes τ_l, τ_k :

$$\eta = \frac{G_t}{y_t}.$$

- Empirical evidence: η fairly constant over time; 20% for US.
- Within endogenous growth economy:
 - equalize human, physical capital returns on BGP;
 - implies optimum of "equal flat tax regime",

$$\tau_l = \tau_k.$$

- Given η , Azacis, Gillman 2010 show tax rates should equal η :

$$\tau_l = \tau_k = \eta,$$

- Adding goods tax τ_c , set "composite labor tax rate" to η :

$$\frac{\tau_c + \tau_l}{1 + \tau_c} = \tau_k = \eta.$$

Example 18.3 Optimal Taxes, Debt and Deficit

- Assume on BGP $\eta = 30\%$, $\tau_c = 0$, and

$$\tau_l = \tau_k = \eta = 0.30,$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\text{Deficit}}{y_0} = \frac{G_0 - (\tau_l w_0 l_0 h_0 + \tau_k r_0 k_0)}{y_0},$$

$$\gamma = \frac{w_0 l_0 h_0}{y}, \quad (1 - \gamma) = \frac{r_0 k_0}{y},$$

$$\frac{\text{Deficit}}{y_0} = \frac{G_0}{y_0} - \tau_l \left(\frac{w_0 l_0 h_0}{y_0} \right) - \tau_k \left(\frac{r_0 k_0}{y_0} \right),$$

$$\frac{\text{Deficit}}{y_0} = 0.30 - 0.30\gamma - 0.30(1 - \gamma) = 0.$$

- No deficit in equilibrium; carries over to zero debt to output ratio:

$$\frac{D_0}{y_0} = \frac{G_0 - (\tau_l w_0 l_0 h_0 + \tau_k r_0 k_0)}{y_0 \rho (1 + g)} = 0.$$

- A responsible guide to government finance in long run.

Greek Debt Crisis and Ricardian Equivalence

- 2009 Greek deficit-output ratio 12.5%, debt to output 113%;
 - "sustainable" long run BGP debt-output ratio implies

$$DY_{2009} \equiv \frac{\frac{\text{Deficit}}{y_{2009}}}{\rho(1+g)} = \frac{0.125}{\rho(1+g)} = 1.13.$$


- With $\rho = 0.0526$, growth rate would need to be

$$g = \frac{0.125}{\rho(1.13)} - 1 = \frac{0.125}{(0.0526)(1.13)} - 1 = 1.103,$$

- or 110% : 50 times higher than historical average growth rates.
- Implied growth rates implausible.
 - Greece requires lower deficit through higher taxes, less spending.
 - May resort to trying to print money.
 - But in Euro, and cannot print money; only can if leave Euro.
- Stark choices: fundamentals of Ricardian Equivalence in action.
 - Greece could leave Euro and inflate economy.
 - Or ECB could itself print money to buy Greek debt:
 - causing higher inflation rate across Euro zone; depreciated Euro.

- Government builds public capital, adds to wealth of nation.
 - as infrastructure, a public good, as in Samuelson 1954.
 - Infrastructure lowers operating costs of free markets.
 - Government role allowed in law, economics tradition:
 - Coase's 1960 theorem: exchange of property rights
 - can decrease transaction costs of exchange.
- Useful public capital includes legal system of laws.
- M. Friedman has argued efficient government
 - can provide such public capital, but grow slower than output,
 - so shrinking share of government expenditure in output;
 - this means that η should go down, rather than being constant,
 - thereby decreasing tax burden.
- Spending to GDP as trended down post-WWII US, UK

Government Expenditure as % of GDP



Flat Tax Policy Around the World

- International trend: towards lower capital, labor tax rates.
 - In many cases, taxes have become more “balanced”
 - between capital, labor, and consumption tax.
 - And have become more "flat", with fewer "brackets".
- US: 92% 1952 tax rate for top-bracket personal income;
 - 52% top-bracket corporate income tax was.
 - US: 35% 2010 top rates for corporate, personal income tax.
 - Shows trend down, with balancing, and flattening.
- Called “The Global Flat Tax Revolution” by Mitchell, 2007.
 - Equal flat tax rates on both personal, corporate income
 - Romania- 16%; Serbia- 14%;
 - equal rates on personal, corporate, VAT: Slovakia- 19%.
 - Baltic tax reforms started in 1994 in Estonia,
 - by 2007, average Baltic personal tax rate of 25%,
 - average corporate tax rates of 10%.
 - Russia, Ukraine, Georgia: flat corporate tax 24%, personal income 13%.
- Motivation: low balanced flat taxes; less tax evasion, higher growth.